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Abstract. The governance of international agribusiness has changed dramatically 
over the past two decades, and an important aspect of that change has been the 
increasing use of certification systems that cover a wide range of product and pro-
duction attributes. While certification is often represented by its advocates as a 
depoliticized and scientific means of governing, some argue that governing by 
standards is better understood as an ongoing and never-ending process summed 
up by the term ‘standardizing work’. Expanding on this, I suggest that the twin 
concept of ‘standardizing network’ may be used to refer to actors and intermedi-
aries engaged in standardizing work with reference to a particular standard. Em-
pirically grounded in the banana industry of the eastern Caribbean island St Vin-
cent – an industry having adopted both GLOBALGAP and Fairtrade certification 
– the article examines the role of interpretation as standardizing work. Discussing 
the GLOBALGAP certification process, I suggest that a chain of interpretive au-
thority is at work, which, particularly in the wake of a standard revision, encour-
ages a stricter than necessary operationalization of requirements. Furthermore, I 
argue that the space opened by the absence of authoritative interpretations may 
invite an entanglement of standardizing networks and that an appreciation of this 
sometimes entangled nature of standardizing networks is necessary if we are to 
attain a fuller understanding of agri-food certification processes in the sphere of 
production. This is demonstrated empirically through an account of the influence 
of the Vincentian Fairtrade national farmers’ organization on the GLOBALGAP 
certification process.
Introduction
since the 1990s, a rapidly growing body of research has been increasingly occupied 
with understanding the evolving roles of private actors and market-driven ap-
proaches in agri-food governance since the 1990s. an important concern has been 
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to understand the developing role of private governance initiatives such as certifica-
tion systems addressing a wide range of product and production attributes.1 some 
writers have sought answers in the relationship between public and private regula-
tion pointing to the importance of changing public strategies in dealing with food 
safety (Marsden et al., 2000), the failure to agree on intergovernmental standards 
for the agri-food industry (Friedmann, 2005) or, with regard to maximum residue 
levels and traceability requirements, a strengthening of intergovernmental regula-
tion (Hoffman and Vossenaar, 2007; Henson and Humphrey, 2009). The passage of 
the UK Food Safety Act 1990 has been cited as a watershed event, which effectively 
placed responsibility upon food retailers, and ultimately the courts, to decide what 
would be reasonable checks of food safety in the supply chain (Hobbs and kerr, 
1992). a due diligence requirement has also found its way into EU food law and 
was a significant driver behind the multiple retailers’ development of supply-chain 
management schemes. The shift to supply-chain management, however, is arguably 
more than a response to new food safety legislation, representing a new way of per-
forming the economy, whereby businesses utilize standards as one of several means 
to shape the playing field (Busch, 2007). Private standards, suggest Henson and 
Humphrey (2010, p. 1629), ‘appear to be simultaneously a substitute for inadequate 
public regulation, a response to increasingly stringent regulation, and a means of 
‘going beyond’ public regulations to provide credible bases for product differentia-
tion’.
Henson and Humphrey (2009) argue that private standards ‘go beyond’ public 
regulation in two distinct ways: on the one hand, by allowing for differentiation 
according to qualities not covered by public regulation and, on the other, by specify-
ing how outcomes required by public regulation, mainly with regard to food safety, 
should be reached. For retailers the former standards are means of realizing opportu-
nities inherent in an increased consumer demand for sustainability, including social 
equity, whereas the latter standards are oriented towards threats such as liability and 
loss of brand capital associated with failure to control risks (see also Henson and 
Northen, 1998). The latter kind of certification is most often not communicated to 
consumers, as retailers have found it beneficial to make food safety and baseline en-
vironmental and worker health and safety standards collaborative and non-compet-
itive issues (Homer, 2009). retailer collaboration can lower the costs of standard set-
ting and broaden the base of potential suppliers (International Trade Centre, 2011), 
it can confer legitimacy upon initiatives, and it can be a way of pre-empting more 
comprehensive public regulation (McCluskey and Winfree, 2009). Product differen-
tiation standards, meanwhile, have come to play an important role in retailers’ com-
petitive strategies. Labels that communicate certification ostensibly have the ability 
of transforming credence attributes to search attributes, allowing for a broadening of 
the range of qualities on which competition can centre (Caswell, 1998). Certification 
labels essentially ask consumers to place their trust in a standard and its accompany-
ing enforcement structures rather than in producer or retailer claims (Homer, 2010).
A certain governance architecture, what Loconto and Busch (2010) have dubbed 
the ‘tripartite standards regime’, has evolved as the gold standard for ensuring the 
integrity of certification systems, involving a separation of powers between standard 
setters, certification bodies and accreditation bodies. The use of an accredited and 
purportedly independent third party to certify producers increases scheme cred-
ibility while allowing retailers to offset certification expenses to the certified party 
(Henson and Northen, 1998; Hatanaka et al., 2005; Busch, 2007). Moreover, the prac-
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tice is typically depicted in a techno-scientific language that bolsters its status (Bain 
et al., 2010) and may create an impression of the tripartite standards regime as a 
depoliticized means of governance. This belies the considerable performative power 
of standard setters, certifiers, and others involved in standardizing work (Higgins 
and Larner, 2010). In principle, anyone can develop standards for third-party certifi-
cation and a tremendous proliferation of such standards has occurred over the past 
two decades. national and international standards organizations, individual retail-
ers, industry consortia, and ngos all set standards and sometimes in an overlap-
ping or competing manner. riisgaard (2009, p. 8) notes how the ‘diverging interests 
of different actors and the role that standards play in how lead-firms are governing 
value chains make standards highly contested arenas’. The many potential func-
tions of standards for various actors in agricultural value chains (cost-cutting, risk-
mitigating, brand-making, door-opening, awareness-raising, etc.) contribute to the 
flourishing of a market for standards. Several studies have examined the effects of 
competition in this market place, arguing that parallel initiatives may spur a ‘race 
towards the lowest standards’ (riisgaard, 2009, p. 9) or seeing rivalry as inherently 
positive in encouraging innovation and an ‘ends-over-means’ approach (smith and 
Fischlein, 2010, p. 520).
When looking at upstream actors in the value chain, the competition perspective 
may not be as relevant. In buyer-driven commodity chains (Gereffi and Korzenie-
wicz, 1994), producers tend to be far more restricted in choosing standards. While 
producers may be able to use standards to differentiate their products or to proac-
tively ensure buyers of their commitment to certain practices, certifications are in 
many cases market entry requirements, turning de jure voluntary standards into de 
facto mandatory ones (Henson and Reardon, 2005; Busch, 2011). The combination of 
a risk mitigation standard, now required by several leading European retailers, with 
a product differentiation standard is increasingly seen as necessary for maintaining 
access to the most attractive export markets (Homer, 2010). However, to date not 
much research has explicitly explored, from a producer perspective, the kind of ef-
fects that may occur when producers are simultaneously subjected to two or more 
sets of rules and governance structures. This is not to say that challenges or opportu-
nities associated with multiple certifications have gone entirely unnoticed. A review 
of research on Fairtrade certification mentions a number of studies suggesting that 
Fairtrade price premiums and/or organizational structures can enable a transition 
from conventional to organic farming (Nelson and Pound, 2009). Bain (2010) has 
documented how the Chilean fresh fruit sector was able to avoid multiple audits by 
devising its own Chilegap standard, thereby satisfying the requirements of both 
the European and Us markets. also relevant is ouma’s (2010) discussion of the fric-
tion emanating from attempts to keep in play ‘multiple principles of evaluation’ in 
the kenyan horticulture industry. ouma (2010, p. 205) notes that the embeddedness 
of standard implementers in ‘specific institutional and environmental contexts and 
particular business cultures’ renders implementation practices less than straightfor-
ward. While it is not his main concern, the notion of multiple evaluative principles 
may well be used to investigate the interrelations of co-implemented standard sys-
tems. such an approach seems well suited for studying how standards, understood 
as differing conceptualizations of quality and legitimate action, may ‘clash’. How-
ever, it may also risk leading attention away from how the many requirements of 
standards can be understood and operationalized differently by variously situated 
actors and how the co-implementation of standards may compound this matter. a 
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crucial part, therefore, of any in-depth exploration of the entanglement of certifica-
tion systems in the sphere of production is an investigation of how the many actors 
involved in implementation processes collectively make sense of standards.
Standardizing Work and Standardizing Networks
Writing with particular reference to private standards initiatives initiated in the 
south, Tallontire et al. (2011, pp. 429–430, emphasis in original) assert that ‘we need 
new tools to consider horizontal governance, i.e. how these new regulatory institu-
tions involve and affect others formally or informally involved in setting, monitor-
ing, improving or implementing such standards at the national level’. I would add 
that we also need to consider how these actors in turn affect the regulatory institu-
tions. To do so it is necessary to complement what Higgins and Larner (2010, p. 205) 
describe as ‘realist approaches’ to standardization with approaches that allow us to 
see ‘standardizing work as an ongoing and never completed process of “making up” 
objects, subjects and practices of modern governing’. standardizing work is not the 
exclusive domain of actors with officially mandated roles, such as standard setters, 
certifiers and standard implementers, but can include the activities of other stake-
holders such as development agencies, state officials, interest groups, businesses 
and non-certified producers. One significant kind of standardizing work is found 
in the interpretation of standards. While the professional discourse on certification 
may play this down, the process of interpreting requirements and adapting them to 
local conditions is far from straightforward, and this may well have consequences in 
terms of time and resources invested to ensure compliance.
Expanding on the notion of standardizing work and taking a cue from actor-net-
work theory (Whatmore and Thorne, 2008; Loconto and Busch, 2010; Konefal and 
Hatanaka, 2011) I find it useful to introduce a twin concept of standardizing networks, 
understood as networks of actors and intermediaries engaged in standardizing 
work with reference to a particular standard. a standardizing network will include 
both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of governance (Tallontire et al., 2011), 
and one may find that standardizing networks overlap, revealing the entanglement 
of certification systems through actors engaged in standardizing work in two or 
more networks. such entanglements are not in and of themselves good or bad but 
are connections through which standard systems can affect each other and as such 
are deserving of attention. In the following, I set out to demonstrate the entangled 
nature of two certification systems – GLOBALGAP and Fairtrade – as they are en-
acted through their standardizing networks on the island of St Vincent in the Eastern 
Caribbean. I begin by providing some historical context before describing the two 
standardizing networks and their key actors. a case is then presented, detailing how 
the introduction of a revised version of the GLOBALGAP standard in 2008 occa-
sioned a spell of interpretive work in which the national farmers’ Fairtrade organi-
zation was an influential participant. The subsequent analysis seeks to account for 
the factors contributing to the entanglement of the two systems.2
The Vincentian Banana Industry
St Vincent and the Grenadines is a multi-island state located in the eastern Caribbe-
an, boasting a combined land mass of 389 km2 and a population of roughly 120 000. 
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as with grenada, st Lucia and Dominica – the other Windward Islands of the former 
British West Indies – export agriculture has been a mainstay of St Vincent’s economy 
since it was colonized in the eighteenth century. The British transformed these islands 
to sugar colonies, bringing in african slaves and later on indentured servants to cov-
er the plantations’ demand for labour. From the middle of the twentieth century on-
wards, however, bananas quickly rose to prominence as the dominant export crop as 
the British company Geest committed itself to marketing all export-quality bananas 
to the UK from the islands. British authorities, while having their doubts about the 
islands’ ability to compete successfully in the banana trade, nonetheless encouraged 
the development, partly because it was conceived that bananas could afford social 
and political stability to the islands (Thomson, 1987; Clegg, 2002), but also because 
Britain’s foreign exchange benefited from having a supply of bananas from its own 
colonies (grossman, 1994; Welch, 1994). Consequently Windward Island bananas 
were granted unlimited duty-free access to the Uk market (grossman, 1994; Lake, 
1997). In contrast to sugar, the banana readily lent itself to a peasant mode of produc-
tion, relying heavily on household labour and often confined to small plots on steep 
slopes in relatively inaccessible areas (Thomson, 1987; Trouillot, 1988). smallholders 
embraced this opportunity to the point that the Windward Islands experienced a 
banana boom in the 1950s, and it has been calculated that in St Vincent the banana 
share of total exports increased from 5.6% in 1955 to 48.3% in 1959 (spinelli, 1973). It 
bears noting that the banana not only represented the prospects of a decent income 
to the peasantry, but also a sense of autonomy. at a time when many were still rely-
ing on employment on plantations, to be a self-sufficient banana farmer signalled a 
sense of accomplishment that was not reducible to simple economic gain. Farming 
was an opportunity to be independent and self-made (grossman, 1998). Indeed, ba-
nana farming in the Windward Islands is still valued for the freedom it provides the 
farmer, despite the many existing regulatory constraints (slocum, 2006).
Quality Issues and Controls
This is not the place for an account of the changing fortunes of Windward Island ba-
nanas or the many challenges faced by the industry and the farmers, but it is worth 
noting that after the initial boom of the 1950s it became clear that efforts would have 
to be made to improve the quality of the exported produce. Quality scores were in-
consistent and often far below those of ‘dollar bananas’,3 causing the British govern-
ment to threaten to withdraw preferential treatment (grossman, 1994). Writing of st 
Vincent, Spinelli (1973, p. 189) notes that ‘the heady venture into bananas inevitably 
brought ill-equipped farmers into the industry’. The lands these farmers had ac-
cess to were often second-rate and small farm sizes and rugged terrain prevented 
any significant mechanization. In the early days, farmers hardly used pesticides or 
inorganic fertilizers and when such inputs were promoted by industry officials in 
the 1970s, farmers would often be unable to follow recommended application rates 
(Hubbard et al., 2000). still, it was believed that research and development along 
with efforts to educate farmers could render the industry more viable. From the 
mid-1970s onwards the islands’ statutory banana growers’ associations (BGAs) to 
which the farmers were obliged to sell required them on several occasions to make 
significant changes in harvesting and packing procedures intended to optimize fruit 
quality (grossman, 1998). It was not until the early 1990s, when European integra-
tion threatened to erode the industry’s trade preferences in the Uk market, that the 
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industry began to consider radical steps to improve its competitive standing. This 
was to be achieved by weeding out the farmers who were unable to deliver a con-
stant supply of top-quality fruit. a programme for restructuring was agreed upon, 
involving the creation in 1994 of a new company – the Windward Islands Banana 
Development Company (WIBDECO)4 – co-owned by the island governments and 
the BGAs. WIBDECO, in a joint venture with the Ireland-based multinational fruit 
company Fyffes, was able to acquire Geest’s banana division the following year, 
thereby expanding its operations into shipping and marketing (Lewis, 1998). The 
company then set about to penetrate the retail sector where the best prices were to 
be attained. To do so required some wooing of the multiples who were reluctant to 
source bananas from the Windward Islands precisely because of the quality issues. 
In 1996, WIBDECO launched its own certification system, the Certified Growers’ 
programme (Cgp), tailored to meet the multiples’ requirements (st. Lucia online, 
2000). Certified farmers would receive premium prices in return for adherence to 
specified agronomic and hygiene practices, the construction of an adequate packing 
shed and the availability of an access road to the farm (Lewis, 1998; Clissold, 2001). 
The level of investment required, however, made it difficult for the smallest grow-
ers to attain certification (Addy, 1999). Indeed, it was an expressed objective of the 
restructuring enterprise to create the conditions whereby only a core of progressive 
and productive growers would remain, and it was believed that these growers could 
be assisted in increasing their production to the point where they could make up for 
the reduced total number of active growers (Lewis, 1998; aasprong, 2012). EU fund-
ing, which provided the backbone of the restructuring enterprise, was to be strategi-
cally directed at farmers who were certified or who had the potential to become so 
(Hubbard et al., 2000). For a while it seemed that the Cgp was successful in turning 
things around, but more trouble loomed ahead. The new millennium brought with 
it reduced banana prices, a series of hurricanes, and continued uncertainty with re-
gard to the future of trade preferences, all contributing to a continued decline in 
the number of active growers, taking the Windward Islands banana industry to the 
brink of collapse.
Survival by Certification?
since the restructuring exercise of the 1990s and the introduction of the Cgp in 1996, 
the fortunes of the Windward Islands banana industry have been tied to its ability 
to supply the Uk multiples with what they want. This was the decade that the Uk 
multiples began in earnest to develop their own food safety codes, responding to 
the Food safety act 1990, which extended their liability for food safety upstream 
(Hobbs and kerr, 1992; Henson and northen, 1998). shortly after the introduction of 
the Cgp, several Uk multiples, along with counterparts on the European continent, 
began work on what would become the GLOBALGAP standard – a harmonized 
set of production standards that would render proprietary codes such as the Cgp 
redundant.
The GLOBALGAP Network
GLOBALGAP, short for Global Good Agricultural Practice, is a sector-specific, pre-
farm gate standard with an emphasis on food safety, also covering areas such as 
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environmental protection, traceability, and worker health and safety. The initiative 
grew out of a retailer consortium established in 1997 under the name EUrEp (Euro-
retailer produce Working group). While the secretariat was hosted by a german re-
tail institute, the chairman was nigel garbutt of the Uk food retailer giant safeway, 
a man who had previously played a key part in bringing to fruition the assured pro-
duce Scheme – an industry-wide certification system for domestic producers in the 
UK (van der Grijp, 2007). The first EUREP protocol, with a scope covering fruits and 
vegetables, was ready in 1999 and named EUrEpgap (Möller, 1999). The standard 
was devised as a generic HaCCp approach to farming and was comprehensive in 
scope, covering farm activity from the seed stage to the dispatch of the final product 
(Campbell, 2005). It has since been revised three times (in 2004, 2007 and 2010) and 
with the third edition the name of the standard, as well as the organization in charge 
of it, was changed to GLOBALGAP (the name used hereafter), reflecting the initia-
tive’s global ambitions and expanding reach.
several of the Uk multiples sourcing Windward Islands bananas were actively 
involved in creating GLOBALGAP. Inevitably they must have wanted WIBDECO to 
adopt the system, and in 2003 WIBDECO began sensitizing farmers about the stand-
ard (Government of Saint Lucia, 2003). It was decided that WIBDECO, as a producer 
group, should apply for what is referred to under GLOBALGAP as an Option 2 
certification, designed to make certification feasible for smallholders. With Option 
2, the producer group is required to run a quality management system (QMs), car-
rying out annual internal inspections of all growers covered by the certification. The 
QMS itself is subject to an annual external audit by an accredited certification body, 
chosen by the producer group. Producer group certification allows for the centrali-
zation of certain tasks, such as generic paper work, easing the burden somewhat on 
the individual producer. nonetheless, EUrEpgap represented an even more for-
midable challenge to the small farmers than what had been the case with the Cgp. 
During a farm inspection, which could be expected to last around four hours, the 
inspector would verify compliance with more than 250 control points. These were, 
and still are, divided into three categories: ‘major musts’ (requiring total compli-
ance), ‘minor musts’ (95% compliance rate), and ‘recommendations’ (compliance is 
not required but recommended) (EUREPGAP, 2001; WIBDECO, 2004). In St Vincent 
the first grower to obtain GLOBALGAP certification did so in late 2004 but here, as 
on the other Windward Islands, the process of having farmers certified progressed 
slowly and by 2010 less than half of approximately 1,000 active banana farmers were 
GLOBALGAP certified (Daniel, 2010). In my conversations with growers and exten-
sion officers, requirements frequently mentioned as troublesome pertained to man-
datory training, record keeping, mandatory equipment and infrastructure, and, to 
a lesser degree, knowledge of ‘good agricultural practice’. At the time of fieldwork 
the team of extension officers under the direction of the St. Vincent Banana Grow-
ers’ Association spent a significant portion of their time assisting farmers with the 
certification issues on an individual basis.
The Fairtrade Network
In contrast to GLOBALGAP’s market and consumer orientation, Fairtrade certifica-
tion grew out of a broader fair trade movement concerned with the reduction of pov-
erty and the empowerment of producers in developing countries. More specifically, 
the initiative aimed to assist smallholders in collectively lifting themselves out of 
98 Haakon Aasprong
exploitative and unsustainable trade relationships by creating links with concerned 
importers and consumers in the north. Early formalized fair trade5 initiatives were 
developed by charities, oxfam being a notable example, in the years following the 
second World War (Dankers, 2003). From the late 1980s onwards, several nation-
al fair trade labelling schemes began to appear in Europe and, in 1997, these were 
mainstreamed under Fairtrade International, the umbrella organization formally in 
charge of the Fairtrade standards6 (raynolds, 2000).
The adoption of Fairtrade certification in the Windward Islands banana industry 
was the outcome of a farmer-led initiative dating back to 1992. The year was a peak 
year in terms of industry revenue but also a time of uncertainty about the continua-
tion of trade preferences as EU members were negotiating a common banana regime 
to be implemented under the single European Market. seeking to take a proactive 
role in the face of less favourable terms of trade, the Windward Islands Farmers’ 
association (WInFa) began to explore whether marketing arrangements could be 
adjusted to the benefit of the producers. As an umbrella organization for farmers’ 
associations in the Windward Islands, WInFa had realized the value of establish-
ing links with other producer organizations and ngos internationally.7 Its network 
included Christian Aid and Oxfam in Britain, NGOs which sponsored and coor-
dinated a WINFA fact-finding mission to the UK and Belgium in 1992. It was here 
that WINFA delegates learned of pioneer efforts in the marketing of fairly traded 
bananas in Europe and were encouraged to pursue that path. still, a number of ob-
stacles had to be cleared before the first Windward Islands Fairtrade bananas were 
ready to ship. Importantly, British multiples had to be persuaded to put their weight 
behind Fairtrade certification, but so did banana farmers and industry officials in the 
Windward Islands. In lobbying the former, WInFa had great help from its ngo al-
lies, including the Fairtrade Foundation. In St Vincent, the leadership of the Banana 
growers’ association was sceptical of Fairtrade, perhaps fearing that a national 
Fairtrade organization would be a challenger vying for authority and control of the 
industry (Rose, 2009). Despite local controversy the first shipment of Fairtrade ba-
nanas from the Windward Islands arrived in the Uk on 25 July 2000 (Liddell, 2000), 
and Fairtrade exports grew significantly over the succeeding years in response to 
increased demand (Smith, 2010; Fairtrade Foundation, 2011). By 2009, more than 
90% of the Windward Islands banana farmers were registered as Fairtrade produc-
ers and were organized in national Fairtrade organizations such as the St Vincent 
and the Grenadines Fairtrade Organization (SVGFTO), coordinated by WINFA. Of 
the bananas exported to the Uk that same year, 90% were sold on Fairtrade terms 
suggesting that Fairtrade certification had afforded a new lease of life to the industry 
(Fairtrade Foundation, 2010).
Fairtrade standards apply to the production as well as to the trade relationship. 
The trade standard requires, inter alia, that producers are guaranteed a minimum 
price, calculated to cover the cost of sustainable production. on top of the mini-
mum price, the producer group is guaranteed a premium to facilitate democrati-
cally elected community development projects. The producer standard covers so-
cial, socio-economic and environmental development, as well as labour conditions. 
For the farmers this entails restrictions on their use of pesticides, and in particular 
herbicides, but they must also maintain uncultivated, pesticide-free buffer zones 
next to streams and roads. The producer organization is required to operate in a 
democratic, transparent, and non-discriminative manner with an overarching aim to 
‘promote the environmentally-sustainable social and economic development of the 
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organization and its members’ (FLo, 2009, p. 6). In this manner, the Fairtrade stand-
ards encourage farmers to make use of their organization to collectively overcome 
difficulties of all sorts. The following case demonstrates how the St Vincent and the 
grenadines Fairtrade organization actively sought to assist its members in dealing 
with a GLOBALGAP control point construed as such a problem.
Beyond the Standard: The Case of the Lunch Rooms
As I arrived in St Vincent for a year of fieldwork in July 2008, banana farmers were 
coming to grips with the latest version of the GLOBALGAP standard. With this new 
version the certification system had been renamed from EUREPGAP and Vincentian 
banana farmers, perhaps intimidated by the name change, perceived the revision 
to be a major one. Moreover, I learned that farmers were failing the internal inspec-
tions at an alarming rate and that this was at least in part because they lacked ‘lunch 
rooms’ on the farms.8 on a number of occasions I overheard farmers voicing their 
frustration over this and other requirements, but what does the standard actually 
say? GLOBALGAP version 3, published in August 2007, added 11 new ‘major must’ 
and 21 new ‘minor must’ control points (Cooper and Graffham, 2009). The control 
points that gave rise to the issue of lunch rooms were two of the new ‘minor musts’: 
one dealing with worker welfare and the other with personal hygiene during fruit 
handling. The worker welfare requirement stipulates that workers should ‘have ac-
cess to clean food storage areas, designated dining areas, hand washing facilities 
and drinking water’ (GLOBALG.A.P., 2007a, AF. 3.5.4.). The hygiene requirement 
stipulates that ‘smoking, eating, chewing and drinking [should be] confined to des-
ignated areas segregated from products’ (GLOBALG.A.P., 2007a, FV. 5.2.4.). None of 
these control points call explicitly for a lunch room in the sense of a physical structure, 
but they specify that a designated area should be set apart from areas of produce han-
dling and storage. Yet, the idea that GLOBALGAP required lunch rooms seemed to 
be firmly entrenched in the Vincentian banana industry. If the requirement had been 
interpreted in a stricter than necessary manner, why was that the case? To answer 
that question it is necessary to examine two factors that have had a strong bearing 
on standardizing work in this case. First, when new GLOBALGAP requirements are 
introduced, an interpretative space is opened that can only be closed when an exter-
nal audit has taken place and the auditor, with their interpretive authority, has made 
a judgement. During this period between revision and audit, uncertainties with re-
gard to what is demanded could well have the effect of swaying certification stake-
holders into operating with stricter interpretations than would have been necessary. 
If, as claimed, farmers were failing their internal inspections partly because they 
lacked lunch rooms, in all probability this was because internal inspectors wanted 
to avoid any questioning of the integrity of the QMs. second, when no authoritative 
interpretation has been established there is more room for other actors with a stake 
in certification to influence the understanding of requirements. In this case, the SVG-
FTO did just that by seeking to assist farmers in attaining GLOBALGAP certification 
by providing materials for the construction of lunch rooms. In the following two 
sections I examine these propositions in closer detail.
The Chain of Interpretive Authority
Once a revised version of the GLOBALGAP standard is introduced a process is 
initiated by which key actors’ interpretations of the requirements are calibrated. 
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It is a process whereby multiple layers of control manifest themselves as actors of 
increasing authority check up on each other. Uncertainties occasioned by new or 
changed rules will eventually be reduced if not completely eliminated. This case 
demonstrates, however, that one manner of dealing with uncertainties is to entrench 
stricter than necessary interpretations, which may divert time and resources that 
could have been employed more strategically in ensuring standard compliance. at 
the heart of this process is what I call the ‘chain of interpretive authority’, emphasiz-
ing the involvement of a chain of actors with diminishing privilege in establishing 
interpretations.
The chain of interpretive authority consists of the GLOBALGAP standard setters, 
the certification body carrying out the annual external audit,9 WIBDECO’s QMS, 
industry extension officers, and the farmers. While the GLOBALGAP standard is 
published online and in theory available to anyone in the chain, it is not expected 
that farmers, many of whom have little education beyond primary school (Titus et 
al., 2008),10 get immersed in standard documents. The farmers rely rather on others, 
primarily the extension officer in their area, to explain the details of what needs to be 
done. The extension officers, who each assist about 100–150 farmers (Sylvester Van-
loo, personal communication, 1 october 2008), build up a good deal of experience 
with the standard and share their experiences with one another in weekly meetings. 
Furthermore, once a farmer has completed an inspection he or she will take the 
results to the extension officer who, in the case of non-compliances, will assist in 
making any necessary corrective actions. In this manner, the extension officers stay 
attuned to the internal inspectors and adjust their own understandings of the re-
quirements when necessary. When a revised standard is introduced the first internal 
inspections are important ‘first tests’ of the extension officers’ interpretations. How-
ever, the internal inspectors may find that their take on the standard differs from that 
of the external auditor whose interpretive authority outweighs their own (Djama et 
al., 2011). Consequently, the external audits are awaited with anxious anticipation 
by all industry stakeholders. Everybody knows that the auditor’s judgements will 
validate or reject interpretations made further down the chain. The authority rela-
tions of the chain are rigidly formalized: the certification body must be approved by 
GLOBALGAP, the WIBDECO QMS is audited by the certification body, and farmers 
are inspected by the internal inspectors. additionally, a random sample of farmers 
and the extension services in their capacity as advisers are also checked during the 
external audit.11 While there is fairly frequent communication among the actors of 
the chain situated in St Vincent, and also between St Vincent and WIBDECO’s head 
office in St Lucia, the crucial delay in the chain is caused by the lapse of time between 
a standard revision and the external audit. When an external auditor eventually pro-
vides a definite interpretation of requirements, time, money and efforts may have 
been invested in complying with a stricter than necessary interpretation.
The issue of interpretation and the case of the lunch rooms came up when I in-
terviewed the man who did the 2008 external audit on St Vincent. Speaking on one 
of the final days of his visit, and with reference to what he had seen during farm 
inspections, he was happy that the internal inspectors had taken a tough approach 
to farm inspections. They ‘should give no mercy’, he expressed, explaining that he 
himself did not want to have to give mercy on the external audit. ‘Let the exter-
nal auditor maybe make a judgment, but the internal auditor get very strict’, he 
concluded (interview, 6 november 2008). The operations manager in charge of the 
extension team had a somewhat different perspective, worrying that for every farm 
 Entangled Standardizing Networks 101
with a lunch room the pressure would increase on the remaining farmers, regardless 
of what GLOBALGAP actually required. ‘The thing is’, he explained during an in-
terview, ‘once you’ve started [building lunch rooms], it is like you set the standard’ 
(Sylvester Vanloo, interview, 15 May 2009).
The external auditor had left no doubt that the lunch rooms, while nice additions 
to the farms, were not required by GLOBALGAP:
‘You take eating facilities. I’m quite impressed with what they’ve done 
here, on this island… Had they approached it in a more simple fashion I 
would almost certainly have been quite happy with that as well. If you’ve 
got three people working, you don’t need a great big eating facility. You 
can always have three chairs and a sunshade or umbrella. That’s it really’ 
(interview, 6 november 2008).
The view was echoed by WIBDECO’s GLOBALGAP scheme manager who pro-
claimed, while speaking to farmers in St Vincent a few months later, that the lunch 
rooms were not required by GLOBALGAP but nonetheless a positive step for the in-
dustry, which exemplified how St Vincent on occasion went ‘beyond the standard’. It 
seems, however, that going beyond the standard was not a deliberate choice, but the 
outcome of strict internal inspections. This was operations manager’s opinion and 
in his view the damage had already been done by the time the external audit took 
place. at that point there seemed to be no turning back, a momentum having been 
created that would not be stopped easily. To understand why, we must expand our 
view and look at the role played by the SVGFTO.
The SVGFTO and GLOBALGAP
With the growing popularity of Fairtrade among British consumers and retailer 
insistence on GLOBAGAP certification, the two certification systems were, at the 
time of fieldwork, both essentially acting as market entry requirements for Wind-
ward Islands bananas to the UK. Consequently, the SVGFTO’s pursuance of Fair-
trade premium financed projects hinged on whether the Fairtrade farmers were also 
GLOBALGAP certified. Were they not, these farmers’ bananas, grown in compliance 
with Fairtrade requirements, would likely end up being sold as conventional ba-
nanas on the regional market. Thus, the SVGFTO had a direct interest in facilitating 
GLOBALGAP certification. To this end the monthly meetings in the 16 local Fair-
trade groups were sometimes used for informational and educational purposes. The 
meetings provided a convenient means for extension officers to pass information 
to farmers on a regular basis. From time to time the groups would also be used for 
workshops on topics such as record keeping, health and hygiene, first aid and pesti-
cides – all rendered necessary by GLOBALGAP. The SVGFTO provided an organiza-
tional structure that could be utilized in the task of bringing hundreds of farmers ‘up 
to standard’. Nevertheless, information given about GLOBALGAP in regular group 
meetings was often ad hoc and on several occasions led to heated arguments, which 
perhaps diminished the value of the meetings as a source of unambiguous guidance.
The SVGFTO’s involvement with lunch rooms did not confine itself to group 
meetings alone. on the national level the national Fairtrade Committee, consisting 
of an elected representative from each group, had decided to use from the Fairtrade 
premium to assist farmers with GLOBALGAP certification. Allocations were made 
in 2008 to assist farmers with infrastructure necessary for certification, including pit 
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toilets, shed improvements and lunch rooms. That assistance had contributed to the 
construction of the lunch rooms that had so impressed the external auditor. accord-
ing to the work plan presented to the SVGFTO general assembly in 2009, a total of 
approximately XCD52,000 (Eastern Caribbean dollars) (UsD19,000) was again allo-
cated for these measures that year. The SVGFTO had been in the process of securing 
significantly more money, however, through external funding from the Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines Social Investment Fund (SVGSIF), a development programme 
largely funded by the EU. In March 2009, four months after the external audit, Vin-
centian media could report that the SVGSIF was about to sign a contract with the 
SVGFTO ‘for the building of 282 ventilated improved pit toilets and 519 lunch fa-
cilities’ throughout the island (NBC Radio News, 2009). With the expressed goal of 
assisting 645 Fairtrade farmers in attaining GLOBALGAP certification the SVGSIF 
committed a total of XCD815,000 (UsD300,000) to the project – a sum that reportedly 
would be met by an equal investment from SVGFTO (NBC Radio News, 2009). The 
money would be used to provide necessary building materials to Fairtrade farmers 
actively seeking GLOBALGAP certification. With this development the process of 
building lunch rooms gained momentum as the whole organizational apparatus of 
the SVGFTO was employed to tackle logistical challenges, comply with procedural 
requirements and ensure that the targets were met.
The sourcing of external funds had committed the SVGFTO to a course of action 
and made it very difficult to raise the question of whether the 519 lunch rooms were 
strictly speaking necessary. In fairness, the lunch rooms, while sometimes described 
as elaborate, were really very simple expansions to existing packing sheds. But was 
there ever a point in time when a more cost effective ‘three chairs and a sunshade’ 
solution was considered? although I was not privy to many of the meetings and 
discussions on the national level, I know that the national Fairtrade Committee, 
following the external audit, had been made aware that other and simpler options 
were acceptable alternatives to lunch rooms. In fact, the national Fairtrade Commit-
tee chairman himself, who was also an extension officer, stressed in a meeting the 
month after the audit that a few chairs in a sheltered and bordered off space would 
have been sufficient for compliance. Yet, once the external audit had afforded clari-
fication with regard to what GLOBALGAP actually demanded, the SVGFTO had 
already established the practice of assisting farmers with materials and had applied 
for funds to scale up that assistance. Farmers who had seen lunch rooms appear on 
other farms were expecting to benefit themselves. From this I infer that the lunch-
room initiative continued because it had considerable support from the farmers. Yet, 
as the distribution of materials progressed, one of the chief barriers to meeting the 
construction targets was the inability or reluctance of many recipients of materials 
to build the actual structures or to pay someone to do the work. some did not even 
collect their materials from the hardware store. The project coordinators warned that 
foot-dragging threatened to bring the whole project to an early end, and they had 
to spend a lot of time doing follow-ups of recipients to ensure that they did their 
part. In the end, however, only a total of 282 lunch rooms were constructed (Ellisia 
Tesheira, personal communication, 3 May 2011).12
The Entanglement of Certification Systems
The case of the lunch rooms demonstrates nicely the ongoing and never-finished 
process of standardizing work, but it also demonstrates how certification systems 
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can entangle through their standardizing networks. some further remarks should be 
made in this respect focusing on the features of the systems that seem to provoke en-
tanglement. It has been noted that the SVGFTO effectively found itself a stakeholder 
in GLOBALGAP certification when both Fairtrade and GLOBALGAP had become 
market entry requirements for Vincentian bananas to the UK and, consequently, the 
continued influx of a Fairtrade premium relied on farmers having both certifica-
tions. seeking to assist farmers with lunch rooms was in this sense a measure of self 
preservation for the SVGFTO. Yet, when the organization took this action it was also 
very much in line with the intent of the Fairtrade standards, which place a great 
deal of weight on the small producer organization’s potential for empowering and 
facilitating the social and economic development of its members (FLO, 2009). Based 
on the premise that the producer group plays a key role in educating and raising 
awareness among its members, the Fairtrade standards are directed at the producer 
group rather than at the individual farmer. an integral part of the Fairtrade stand-
ards therefore deals with organizational structures and practices intended to ‘max-
imise the participation of members and their sense of ownership over the organiza-
tion’ (FLo, 2009, p. 7). possibly because of the strong emphasis on the organization, 
farmers in St Vincent in many cases do not distinguish between the Fairtrade and the 
SVGFTO. Indeed, the term ‘Fairtrade’ is typically used to refer to the SVGFTO, rath-
er than the certification system, the international organization or the larger social 
movement. With GLOBALGAP the situation is very different. A producer group, 
as defined by GLOBALGAP Option 2 certification, is a different kind of entity alto-
gether, its primary function being the operation of the QMS (GLOBALG.A.P., 2007b). 
While this does not preclude the producer group from assuming wider responsi-
bilities with regard to its members, it is evident that GLOBALGAP enacts the pro-
ducer organization as a risk mitigation tool rather than as a potential agent of pro-
ducer empowerment. The fact that the Vincentian farmers’ producer group for the 
purposes of GLOBAGAP certification is WIBDECO reinforces a perception among 
farmers of GLOBALGAP as an external force exerted upon them, much like other 
demands of the market. WIBDECO is based in St Lucia and has since its inception 
wielded considerable power over the farmers as a standard setter and the sole link 
to the Uk market. as such, many farmers view the company with suspicion and it 
is accused regularly of having concern only for its own profits and not for farmers’ 
well-being. Its presence in St Vincent is limited as it falls upon the extension of-
ficers to advise farmers on the GLOBALGAP standard. In sum, where Fairtrade is 
manifested through the SVGFTO and has a continuous presence in farmers’ lives, 
GLOBALGAP is manifested only occasionally through the WIBDECO QMS in a con-
text of control. Where Fairtrade invites farmers to participate through the SVGFTO, 
the GLOBALGAP standard reaches the farmer through extension officers as direc-
tives from WIBDECO – a removed gatekeeper to the market. The glaring absence in 
St Vincent of a GLOBALGAP equivalent of the SVGFTO, i.e. a visible producer or-
ganization manifesting the standard and taking a lead in standardizing work, invites 
the SVGFTO to assume that function. The frequent discussions of GLOBALGAP 
requirements in Fairtrade group meetings, the use of Fairtrade groups as a basis for 
conducting GLOBALGAP workshops, and the use of Fairtrade premium to assist 
farmers with GLOBLAGAP certification are all indicators of the entangled nature of 
the two certification systems. The SVGFTO, it appears, has become a central actor in 
the GLOBALGAP standardizing network.
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Conclusion
In the preceding pages, I have demonstrated two important features of standard-
izing work in the Vincentian banana industry. The first feature pertains to the sig-
nificance of interpretation as a kind of standardizing work and the possible rami-
fications of action taken in the absence of authoritative interpretations. The case of 
the lunch rooms shows how a chain of interpretive authority is at work where each 
actor in the chain is in a position to validate or refute interpretations made closer to 
the farm setting. In this chain the grower is expected to pay heed to the advice of the 
extension officer, the extension officer must accept the interpretations of the internal 
inspector, and the internal inspector is subject to corrections from the external audi-
tor. I argue that in the time following a revision of the GLOBALGAP standard there 
is a tendency that internal inspectors interpret requirements in a stricter than neces-
sary manner so as to avoid questioning of the integrity of the QMs in the subsequent 
external audit. as a consequence, time and resources invested in ensuring standard 
compliance may be deployed in a less than optimal manner while interpretations are 
being calibrated.
The second feature demonstrated is the capacity of certification systems to entan-
gle where actors from one standardizing network have a stake in another network 
and consequently seek to influence the standardizing work in it. This is the case 
in St Vincent where the SVGFTO has found that Fairtrade sales hinge on whether 
Fairtrade farmers are also GLOBALGAP certified, both certifications having become 
market entry requirements in the Uk retail market. as a producer group actively 
seeking its members’ participation, the SVGFTO was well situated to act on behalf 
of the Fairtrade farmers and the Fairtrade premium gave it the financial capacity to 
do so. Moreover, the organization’s endeavours to benefit its members contrasted 
sharply with the more control-oriented focus of WIBDECO. The SVGFTO’s provi-
sion of assistance made it easier for farmers to see the lunch rooms as a potential 
boon and not just a burden; however, it also had the effect of reinforcing prevail-
ing strict interpretations. The national Fairtrade Committee realized, following the 
external audit, that the building of lunch rooms was a somewhat ‘elaborate’ way 
of ensuring compliance but found itself committed to a course of action. With the 
benefit of hindsight one may well question the wisdom of this approach. However, 
the more important message is that the delay in calibrating interpretations created a 
window of opportunity for the SVGFTO to become involved in standardizing work 
and influence the farmers’ understanding of the standard.
The material from St Vincent demonstrates the usefulness of standardizing net-
works as a concept, reminding the analyst of the often broad participation in stand-
ardizing work. as such it is a methodological pointer, guiding the researcher con-
cerned with standard implementation processes, as well as a means of making sense 
of the often less than straightforward nature of those processes. Because standard-
izing networks may well entangle, the concept allows us to appreciate how multiple 
certification systems in the sphere of production can influence and be influenced 
by one another. Despite the now commonplace scenario of co-implementation of 
certification systems, this is a trend that has received little scholarly attention. Re-
search on the impact of agri-food certification systems is a rapidly evolving field of 
study reflecting the tremendous societal importance of certification as governmental 
technology. However, to reach a fuller understanding of certification as a mode of 
governance, researchers need to be critical of techno-scientific discourses, as well as 
realist approaches to standardization. To these should be added meticulous studies 
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of sometimes entangled standardizing networks and the standardizing work going 
on within them.
Notes
1. I use the term ‘certification system’ to refer to the totality of a ‘standard’ and a ‘certification scheme’, 
the latter term referring to the rules that guide the use of certification as an enforcement structure.
2. The article draws on qualitative data collected during a year of field research in St Vincent from July 
2008 to august 2009. of particular importance is participant observation at a range of meetings within 
the framework of the St. Vincent and the Grenadines Fairtrade Organization, including 27 meetings in 
four separate local groups, but also national- and zonal-level meetings and workshops. Thirty-three 
farmers were chosen for in-depth interviews of about an hour on average and 28 in-depth interviews 
of similar length were conducted with industry officials and other key figures. Data are also drawn 
from participant observation of extension work, including extension service meetings, and both inter-
nal and external GLOBALGAP farm inspections. Finally, informal conversations with farmers in the 
farm setting as well as participation in farm work provided a ground-level perspective on certification 
requirements.
3. The term refers to bananas from Latin american plantations owned by Us multinationals, the trade 
of which was carried out in Us dollars. For the historical background on the emergence of the Latin 
american/Us and the Caribbean/European commodity systems in the global banana trade, see rayn-
olds (2003).
4. WIBDECO changed its name to Winfresh in 2010, emphasizing a diversification away from bananas. 
Because the material presented here is from the period prior to that name change I use the old name 
throughout the article.
5. Note the distinction between ‘Fairtrade’ and ‘fair trade’, the former referring to the certification system 
and the latter to the idea and the movement.
6. The organization was originally named Fairtrade Labelling organizations International, changing its 
name to Fairtrade International in 2011.
7. as a civil society organization, WInFa should not be confused with the statutory banana growers’ as-
sociations buying bananas from farmers and selling to WIBDECO. WINFA has been heavily involved 
in championing the cause of Windward Island banana farmers since 1992, but the organization also 
addresses the situation of Caribbean farmers and rural communities more generally, advocating on is-
sues such as food security, gender equity and sustainability <http://www.winfacaribbean.org/index
.php/about-us>.
8. The results of farm inspections being confidential, I was unable to verify this through inspection re-
ports.
9. To my knowledge the same European company had been contracted by WIBDECO each time, possibly 
because there is no GLOBALGAP accredited certification body in the Caribbean.
10. Titus et al.’s (2008) survey of 194 farmers in St Vincent found that 66.5% had received only primary 
education.
11. In practical terms, this means that the external auditor inspects a sample of producers not smaller than 
the square root of the total number of GLOBALGAP registered producers. The auditor also verifies 
documentation establishing the extension officers’ competence, training, and qualifications.
12. It may be that a sizeable number of farmers who were set to receive assistance left the banana industry 
during the period that the project ran.
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